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Introduction
In the digital age, whistleblowing scandals have become the order of the day. Anyone holding con…dential information can easily make it available to the rest of the world by posting it online and organizations like WikiLeaks have specialized in receiving, processing and disseminating leaked information.
Whistleblowers are celebrated as "the heroes of our time" who are "contributing to ethics and integrity" (UN, 2016) and whose legal protection is considered an important concern for public policy (Economist, 2015) . These views presume that whistleblowing does not merely lead to sanctions against the individuals and companies whose illegal or immoral actions are exposed, but a¤ects and improves behavior more broadly; for instance that athletes were deterred from using illicit drugs when whistleblower Yuliya
Stepanova revealed the existence of a large-scale Russian doping program and that radical islamists became less inclined to join the army of the Islamic State when the former insider Abu Hamed exposed the identities of 22,000 secretly enlisted jihadis. Such responses would be consistent with standard economic theories of crime (Becker, 1968) , in which whistleblowing should act as a deterrent of criminal behavior by increasing the likelihood of exposure and, thus, of legal as well as other social sanctions.
This study provides empirical evidence on the deterrence e¤ect of whistleblowing in the context of o¤shore tax evasion. Speci…cally, we investigate whether leaks of customer information from banks in tax havens have deterred the criminal use of o¤shore banking services. While bank accounts in tax havens are not illegal per se, they often serve to evade taxes, which makes account holders and sometimes also the bankers assisting with the tax evasion, liable to criminal prosecution. 1 Hence, for owners of tax haven accounts as well as for bankers in tax havens, leaks of customer …les involve a risk of legal sanctions if the information is acquired by the tax authorities and public humiliation if posted online.
The key empirical challenge is that the criminal use of o¤shore banking services is not directly observable. Our main empirical approach is therefore indirect and amounts to estimating the e¤ect of data leaks on the stock prices of banks that provide such services. Stock prices re ‡ect the net present value of expected future pro…ts given all available information (Fama, 1991) ; hence, if we observe a drop in the stock prices of these banks precisely at the time when customer information is leaked, this is plausibly because …nancial markets expected the pro…ts associated with criminal o¤shore services to decrease. Conceptually, a decrease in expected bank pro…ts could derive either from the o¤shore banking market's demand side (an inward shift in the demand curve) or supply side (an outward shift of the cost curve). In either case, the equilibrium quantity of criminal o¤shore services would be lower than before the leak. 2 For the purposes of the analysis, we carefully select a sample of o¤shore banks that are known to have foreign tax evaders among their customers. We start from the full sample of banks in Switzerland. Although its banking secrecy rules have recently been moderated, Switzerland dominates the global wealth management industry with a market share of around 30% (Zucman, 2013) . Within this sample, we focus on a subsample of Employing a standard event study framework (Kothari and Warner, 2007) , we …nd that the LGT leak caused a signi…cant decrease in the market value of Swiss banks involved in o¤shore tax evasion. The banks in our sample tracked the normal return closely in the ten days preceding the leak, but earned an abnormal return of -1.1% over the …rst two days after the leak and -2.2% over the …rst four days following the leak.
The estimated stock market responses are larger and sharper when returns are weighted by market capitalization; here, we …nd an abnormal return of -2.1% over two days and -3% over four days. In either case, the cumulative abnormal returns are statistically signi…cant based on standard parametric tests as well as non-parametric tests comparing abnormal returns after the leak to the empirical distribution of abnormal returns in the pre-leak period.
These …ndings are suggestive that the leak from LGT Bank lowered market expectations about the future earnings of tax haven banks that assist foreign customers with tax evasion. The most plausible interpretation is that markets perceived the leak as an e¤ective deterrent of o¤shore tax evasion. Since o¤shore tax evasion had never previously been exposed in leaks, o¤shore account owners and bankers most likely did not account for this risk before the leak from LGT Bank. 3 Alternatively, they may have assigned a very small probability to the possibility of a leak and updated their beliefs about this probability the …rst time a leak occurred. In either case, an increase in the perceived probability of a leak should be expected to deter the demand and supply of criminal o¤shore banking services and reduce the earnings of o¤shore banks.
A number of additional empirical tests support this interpretation of the main result and provide further evidence of the mechanisms at play.
First, we show that other Swiss banks than those with known links to o¤shore tax evasion did not earn abnormal returns in the days after the leak. This reassures us that our results are not driven by confounding shocks a¤ecting the entire Swiss …nancial sector and is strongly suggestive that the negative abnormal returns earned by banks in the baseline sample are related to their role in tax evasion.
Second, we explore the heterogeneity of the stock market responses within the baseline sample and …nd a much larger decrease for the banks that were investigated by U.S. prosecutors (abnormal return of -6.1% over four days) than for the banks that subsequently resolved their criminal liabilities through a voluntarily disclosure of their cross-border activities (abnormal return of -1.2% over four days). Presumably, U.S. prosecutors selected Swiss banks for investigation based on ex ante information about their involvement in o¤shore tax evasion, so market participants with a similar information set would plausibly expect the same banks to be most adversely a¤ected by an increase in the risk associated with o¤shore tax evasion. We obtain similar results with an ex post measure of the involvement in o¤shore evasion based on the size of the penalties paid to the U.S..
Speci…cally, we …nd a larger decrease for banks with above-median penalties (abnormal return of -3.2% over four days) than for banks with below-median penalties (abnormal return of -1.4% over four days). This set of results further strengthens the causal link between the banks' losses in market value around the time of the LGT leak and their role in o¤shore tax evasion.
Third, we apply the same event study design to subsequent leaks from other tax haven aggressive tax planning may limit these …rm's ability to avoid taxes in the future, they do not provide evidence of a broader deterrence e¤ect extending beyond the speci…c taxpayers exposed in the media.
2 Background and data
O¤shore tax evasion and Swiss banks
Recent studies estimate that household wealth hidden in tax havens amounts to at least These U.S. enforcement initiatives are useful for our purposes because they identify a group of banks that derived income from assisting U.S. customers with o¤shore tax evasion at the time of the data leak from LGT bank. 8 Upon an increase in the risks associated with o¤shore tax evasion, we should expect precisely these banks to su¤er a decrease in pro…ts. Moreover, the outcomes of the enforcement initiatives allow us to make predictions about the heterogeneity in stock market responses within this sample of banks. First, if U.S. prosecutors chose to investigate the Swiss banks, which they believed ex ante were the most likely to be involved in o¤shore tax evasion and if market participants had similar beliefs, we should expect investigated banks to su¤er larger market value losses than banks subsequently admitting to criminal o¤ences under the Swiss Bank Program. Second, if ex post penalties contain a signal about the degree of involvement in o¤shore tax evasion that was at least partly observable by market participants at the time of the leak, we should expect market value losses to be larger for banks with higher penalties.
Starting from the gross sample of 96 Swiss banks that have been subject to criminal investigations in the U.S. or have participated in the Swiss Bank Program, we arrive at the estimating sample in the following steps. First, our empirical approach requires daily publicly available stock prices, so we disregard banks that are not listed on a stock exchange. However, when a Swiss bank in our sample belongs to a multinational banking group, we include the parent company if listed; for instance, the Swiss entity HSBC Private Bank is owned by the UK-based holding company HSBC Holdings PLC. 9 This procedure yields 49 Swiss entities. Second, we exclude three entities that are classi…ed neither as a bank nor as a …nancial services company under the Industry Classi…cation
Benchmark (ICB) as we do not expect the data leaks to be relevant for these …rms. 10 Finally, as particularly smaller entities are not always being traded, we exclude entities for which no stock return can be identi…ed in the week after the event under consideration.
This yields an estimating sample of 38 Swiss entities for the data leak from LGT Bank in 
Data leaks
The main focus of the analysis is to study banks' stock market responses to the leak of customer data from the Liechtenstein-based LGT Bank. According to journalistic accounts, the leak occurred in 2002 when a computer technician at the bank, Heinrich
Kieber, extracted con…dential customer information from the bank's IT systems. After leaving the bank, he approached the German intelligence agency in 2006 and ultimately sold them a CD-rom with information on the bank's customers in Germany for around e4.2 million. 9 The current parent companies of Swiss banks are identi…ed in Bloomberg and any changes to the parent-subsidiary links are identi…ed in an extensive online research using the banks' own homepages, Wikipedia, and http://www.schweizer-banken.info/ (last accessed on 15 February 2017). In case of multiple listed parent companies on di¤erent hierarchy levels in the company tree, we selected the lowest ranked listed parent company in order to include as few una¤ected entities as possible. 10 Here, we drop American International Group Inc (insurance), Assicurazioni Generali SpA (insurance) and Italmobiliare SpA (construction & materials).
The data leak became publicly known in 2008. After months of secret investigations, on 14 February, the German policy raided the premises of Klaus Zumwinkel, a prominent corporate executive and detained him on charges of tax evasion. The case was immediately picked up by major media outlets, which also reported that the tax evasion scandal involved hundreds of further suspects. On 15 February, several news media reported that the German intelligence service, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), was involved in the case and, on 16 February, the German magazine Der Spiegel was …rst to report that BND had allegedly paid a whistleblower around e5 million for the information leading to the arrest of Klaus Zumwinkel. 11 On 18 February, the news reports contained regular references to the data leak in 2002. While we treat the arrest of Mr. Zumwinkel on 14
February as the event day, we should not expect to see the full e¤ect on the stock prices until three to four days after the event, given the staggered dissemination of information.
The LGT leak in 2008 was, to our knowledge, the …rst data leak from a tax haven bank; however, several others followed in the subsequent years. We have systematically collected information about these leaks by manually searching all the front pages of a major Swiss newspaper, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, for the period between January 2008 and October 2016. Concretely, we searched each front page for the keywords Steuer ("tax"),
Bank ("bank"), Info ("information") and Daten ("data") and manually screened the headlines of all articles on the front pages. For every hit, we read the article to determine whether or not it referred to a data leak from a tax haven. 12 Finally, we searched the articles about data leaks for a reference to the date when the leaks became publicly known; when an article does not mention any date, we assume that the leak occurred one calendar day prior to the article's publication date. The implicit assumption underlying this approach is that data leaks with su¢ cient signi…cance for Swiss banks to move their stock prices would be reported on the front pages of Swiss newspapers.
As detailed in Table 1 , we identi…ed 13 front page articles that concern new data leaks or signi…cant new dissemination of information from existing leaks. Several of the 11 See http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/…nanzskandal-bnd-zahlte-fuenf-millionen-fuer-geheimesteuerdaten-a-535687.html (last accessed on 15 February 2017). 12 We excluded all articles about the Hildebrand a¤air. Philipp Hildebrand is a former president of the Swiss National Bank whose wife bought more than half a million US dollars in August 2011, just one month before the Swiss National Bank capped the exchange rate of the Swiss franc. While the Hildebrand a¤air was triggered by a bank employee leaking information of this transaction, the data leak was limited to Philipp Hildebrand and was never intended to identify any foreign tax evaders. A list of all other articles can be requested from the authors. 
Stock market data
We use Bloomberg to collect …nancial information about the 46 Swiss banks in our estimating sample for the period 1 January 2007 to 31 October 2016. We calculate the daily return on each stock as the simple rate of return of the stock's total return index, which accounts for dividends as well as capital gains Return n;t = P n;t P n;t 1 P n;t 1 ,
where P n;t is the value of the total return index of bank n at time t. All prices are denoted in Swiss francs to avoid any confounding e¤ects of exchange rate movements.
We exclude observations from non-trading days in Switzerland to avoid a small group of banks which is traded outside of Switzerland from dominating the estimates on speci…c days, such as Israeli stocks which are traded on Sundays but not Fridays. 13 Moreover, we exclude observations if the end-of-day stock price remained constant or was missing for at least …ve consecutive Swiss trading days because such stale stocks could otherwise introduce a bias toward zero. Finally, we winsorize returns at the 0.1 and 99.9% level to reduce the in ‡uence of outliers. Table 2 around here
Empirical methodology
The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate how the market values of Swiss banks with ties to o¤shore tax evasion responded to leaks of customer …les and other unanticipated events. For this purpose, we employ a standard event study framework (e.g. Kothari and Warner, 2007).
In a …rst step, for each event to be considered, we identify an event-speci…c bank sample and observation period. The bank sample contains those of the 46 banks in the estimating sample for which stock market data are available for the entire week after the event. 16 The observation period includes the event window, consisting of the event date and 10 trading days before and after the event date, and an estimation window consisting of 250 trading days before the event window, which is roughly one calendar year. So for 14 To be precise, Table 2 uses an unbalanced portfolio accounting for the trading day speci…c company structures and ownership links, which sometimes change over time. The event study regressions use event-speci…c balanced portfolios of those listed companies that are a Swiss bank or own subsidiaries that are Swiss banks for the entire week following the event. 15 These results are not reported. 16 The most common reason why stock market data are not available is that the bank went out of business. For multinational banking groups, we also require that the link to the Swiss bank with criminal liabilities in the U.S. is active in the week after the event; hence, if a U.K banking group has closed its Swiss branch or sold it to a private investor at the time of the event, it does not enter the event-speci…c sample.
every
In a second step, we calculate the daily portfolio return as the average daily stock return across all Swiss banks in the event-speci…c sample
where Return n;t is the return of bank n on day t and N is the number of banks in the event-speci…c sample. We use the portfolio return rather than bank individual returns as the dependent variable in the event study regressions to account for cross-sectional dependence in the returns of individual banks. We also compute a weighted variant of the portfolio return where the daily returns of individual banks are weighted by market capitalization.
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In a third step, we regress the portfolio return on the market return and dummies for the symmetric 21-day window around the event P ortf olio return t = + M arket return t + 10 X s= 10
where M arket return t is the return of the Stoxx Europe 600 on day t and D s is a dummy indicating day s relative to the event.
The parameter captures the correlation between the portfolio return and the market return in the period before the event window and the term + M arket return t thus expresses the normal portfolio return on day t conditional on the market return and absent the leak. The parameter t captures the abnormal return of the portfolio on day t, AR (t), which is simply the di¤erence between the actual and the normal portfolio return.
The main parameter of interest is the cumulative abnormal return over the …rst T days after the event, CAR (T ), where T = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5. The point estimate can be obtained 17 We use the latest available pre-event information on banks'market capitalization so that the weights are una¤ected by the leak. For four banks there is no available information on pre-event market capitalization (see Table A1 in the Appendix), and these banks are therefore not included in the weighted portfolio return.
directly from the coe¢ cients estimated in equation (3) as
In practice, we estimate a slightly modi…ed version of equation (3) that rede…nes the dummies to yield point estimates and standard errors of CAR (T ) directly (Salinger, 1992 ).
Results: Stock prices 4.1 Average e¤ect
We start the empirical analysis by estimating the event study model on the baseline sample of Swiss banks that have either been under criminal investigation for their role in o¤shore tax evasion or participated in the Swiss Bank Program.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , these banks earned abnormal returns of around -0.5% on the …rst day of the LGT leak and on each of the subsequent three trading days.
The cumulative abnormal return of around -2% over four trading days is statistically signi…cant and remained roughly constant in the remainder of the event window. By contrast, abnormal returns were small and not systematically positive or negative in the ten days before the leak. This reassures us that the negative abnormal returns observed after the leak are not driven by a di¤erential underlying trend.
Figure 1 around here
While the con…dence intervals plotted in Figure 1 are derived under the usual parametric assumptions, we also take a non-parametric approach to statistical inference. For instance, to test the statistical signi…cance of CAR (5), we compute the cumulative abnormal return for each …ve-day window in the estimation period (outside of the event window) and plot the empirical distribution as illustrated in Figure 2 . Intuitively, this distribution provides a sense of the variability of abnormal returns in normal times and thus allows us to assess whether the abnormal return observed at the time of the leak is statistically signi…cant. Speci…cally, as illustrated with a vertical line in the …gure, our estimate of CAR (5) is around -2.1%, which corresponds roughly to the 1 st percentile in the distribution. It follows that the probability of observing a more extreme outcome than CAR (5) under the pre-event distribution of returns is around 2%. Or in other words, the p-value associated with a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that CAR (5) = 0 is around 0.02. Applying the same non-parametric test, we …nd that CAR (1) is signi…-cantly di¤erent from zero with a p-value of 0.14, CAR (2) with a p-value of 0.06, CAR (3) with a p-value of 0.02 and CAR (4) with a p-value of 0.00. reaching -2% already after two days and stabilizing at roughly -3% after four days. Table 3 around here These results are instructive by providing a sense of the economic signi…cance of the stock market responses: the combined market value of the 37 banks in the portfolio was almost CHF 1,000 billion (around $900 billion) immediately prior to the leak, so the 3% decrease corresponds to a loss in market value of around CHF 30 billion (around $27 billion). Taken at face value, this measures the net present value of the income losses su¤ered by listed Swiss banks due to the deterrence e¤ect of the data leak. Assuming that Swiss banks earn an annual pro…t margin of 0.5% on assets under management and that stock market investors use a discount factor of 5%, these estimates suggests that the foreign-owned assets managed by Swiss banks in the portfolio were expected to permanently decrease by around CHF 300 billion (around $270 billion). 18 This decrease corresponds to around 10% of the total foreign-owned wealth managed in Switzerland. 19 Having established an economically sizable and statistically signi…cant decrease in the market value of Swiss banks associated with o¤shore tax evasion precisely at the time of the LGT leak, one may still be concerned that the stock market response was in fact not caused by the leak itself but by an unrelated shock coinciding with the leak.
We address this concern by applying the baseline model to a sample of Swiss banks not associated with o¤shore evasion. 20 For most types of shocks unrelated to o¤shore evasion, for instance, monetary policy changes, macroeconomic news and exchange rate ‡uctuations, we should expect the two groups of banks to be similarly a¤ected and, thus, stock prices to follow similar patterns. However, as shown in Column (3), there is no clear trend in the abnormal returns earned by banks not associated with o¤shore evasion after the leak: the cumulative abnormal return in this group was 0.7% after two days and 0.1% after four days. These results are strongly suggestive that the responses identi…ed in the main sample are in fact caused by the leak.
Heterogeneous e¤ects
This section explores how stock market responses to the leak from LGT Bank varied within the estimating sample across Swiss banks with di¤erent involvement in o¤shore tax evasion. We exploit two distinct measures of involvement.
Most importantly, we distinguish between the eight banks that were investigated by U.S. authorities for complicity in tax crimes and the 30 banks that subsequently disclosed their cross-border activities under the Swiss Bank Program. Assuming that U.S.
authorities selected Swiss banks for prosecution based on ex ante information about their involvement in o¤shore tax evasion and further assuming that market participants had 18 Note that these …gures only account for assets held in listed Swiss banks. Assuming that customers in unlisted Swiss banks were deterred to the same extent as customers in listed Swiss banks and that penalties were proportional to the value of foreign-owned assets under management, the implied decrease in assets under management is around CHF 380 billion (around $340 billion) or around 14% of the total foreign-owned assets managed in Switzerland. 19 Zucman (2013, Table A.23 and A.24) puts the foreign-owned wealth held in Switzerland by the end of 2007 at US $3.4 trillion. 20 We identi…ed this set of placebo banks in the equity screen of Bloomberg. Speci…cally, we searched for all actively traded banks and asset managers in Switzerland, and excluded all banks that were investigated in the US for assisting in o¤shore tax evasion or participated in the Swiss Bank Program.
access to a similar information set, we should expect the stock prices of prosecuted banks to be most adversely a¤ected. We estimate the baseline model for the two subsamples separately and plot the results in Figure 3 . The results are strikingly di¤erent: the cumulative abnormal return after four days was -6.1% for the prosecuted banks, but only -1.2% for the voluntary disclosers. Table 4 reports additional results with Columns (1)- (2) showing the estimates from Figure 3 for ease of comparison. Columns (3)- (4) show that a similar pattern prevails if bank returns are weighted by market capitalization in the portfolio return, although the di¤erence between the two groups of banks is less stark: the cumulative abnormal return after four days was -4.6% for the prosecuted banks and -2.1% for the voluntary disclosers. Table 4 around here Ultimately, the involvement of Swiss banks in o¤shore tax evasion should be re ‡ected in the size of the penalties paid in the U.S. We thus split the sample of banks on the size of the penalties and estimate the baseline model for the two subsamples separately.
As shown in Columns (5)-(6), the stock market responses to the …rst leak are stronger for banks with larger ex post penalties: the cumulative abnormal return after four days was -3.2% for banks with above-median penalties and -1.4% for those with below-median penalties. As shown in Columns (7)- (8), a similar pattern emerges when bank returns are weighted by market capitalization in the portfolio return.
By showing that banks'loss in market value around the time of the LGT leak varies systematically with the intensity of their involvement in o¤shore tax evasion, these results further establish the causal link between the leak and the observed decrease in stock prices; it seems unlikely that heterogeneity in this particular dimension would have emerged if the correlation were spurious and stock markets really responded to a simultaneous shock unrelated to o¤shore evasion.
Other events
This section studies the stock market responses to events other than the leak from LGT Bank with the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of the mechanism through which whistleblowing a¤ected the stock prices of Swiss banks involved in o¤shore tax evasion.
The results are reported in Table 5 .
We …rst apply the baseline model to three key dates associated with the leak of Table 5 around here
The results show that stocks of Swiss banks in the estimating sample generally earned negative abnormal returns in the days following news about a leak, however, the e¤ects were relatively modest in size and typically not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. The results are suggestive that the data leaks occurring after the …rst leak from
LGT Bank did not cause a signi…cant reduction in the use of o¤shore bank accounts.
Plausibly, the …rst leak made o¤shore account holders and banks aware of the risk that customer information may be leaked whereas subsequent leaks did not induce any signi…cant upward adjustment in the probabilities assigned to such events. Prior to the …rst leak, they may have believed that data theft from Swiss banks was impossible; that bank employees had no incentive to blow the whistle or that intelligence services and 21 The observation period of this modi…ed event study model includes all trading days from one year prior to the event window of the …rst leak until the event window of the last leak. The sample includes all banks that satisfy the requirements outlined above for all leaks under consideration. tax authorities were not able or willing to use leaked data to prosecute tax evaders and bankers. While the …rst leak changed these priors, any e¤ect of subsequent leaks on the perceived risk appears to be too small to be statistically detectable.
Finally, we apply the baseline model to an event that is entirely unrelated to whistleblowing, but received enormous attention in international media: 20 April 2013 when it became apparent that Uli Hoeness, president of the soccer club FC Bayern Munich and a prominent public person with contacts to high-level politicians including the German chancellor Angela Merkel, was under investigation for tax evasion through accounts in Swiss banks. 22 As shown in Column (5), banks in the baseline sample earned very small and statistically insigni…cant abnormal returns in the days following the news.
This result suggests that media exposure in itself does not decrease the market value of o¤shore banks. This has important implications for the interpretation of the main …ndings: it is consistent with the notion that the LGT leak decreased the market value of Swiss banks through the deterrence of o¤shore tax evasion, but not consistent with the alternative hypothesis that stock markets responded adversely to o¤shore evasion having caught the attention of media, voters and, ultimately, policy makers.
Results: Bank deposits
In this section, we study the deterrence e¤ect of the LGT leak by exploiting an entirely di¤erent data source: the Locational Banking Statistics from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). This publicly available data source provides information on the stock of foreign-owned bank deposits in 47 international banking centers including major tax havens such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, Cayman Islands, Singapore and Hong Kong.
The deposit information in the BIS statistics is reliable because the primary data source is the banks'own balance sheets. To our knowledge, this country-level measure of foreignowned deposits is the only aggregate statistic that captures activities in the wealth man- Our main variable of interest in this analysis is the stock of bank deposits owned by foreign non-bank residents. This variable excludes inter-bank deposits, which is presumably entirely unrelated to tax evasion and thus captures deposits held by households and …rms. The main weakness of the measure in this context is the fact that only deposits are covered whereas other types of assets under management, e.g. bonds and shares, are not. Recent estimates suggest that deposits account for around 25% of the total …nancial wealth managed in tax havens (Zucman, 2013) .
We investigate whether the LGT leak caused a detectable decline in the use of secret o¤shore accounts by comparing the evolution of deposits in tax havens and non-haven 
Concluding remarks
While whistleblowing has become the order of the day in politics, business, sports and many other domains of society, we know little about its consequences. Some argue that it deters criminal activity by increasing the risk of exposure, but, to our knowledge, there is no systematic evidence documenting such an e¤ect. This paper studies whistleblowing in the context of o¤shore tax evasion and an environment in which data leaks were thought to be impossible or at least very unlikely. It documents that the …rst leak of customer …les from a tax haven bank caused a signi…cant decrease in the market value of Swiss banks known to derive revenues from o¤shore tax evasion. Our preferred interpretation is that the leak induced a shock to the detection risk as perceived by o¤shore account holders and banks, which curbed the use of o¤shore bank accounts and ultimately lowered the expected future pro…ts of banks providing access to such tax evasion technologies.
We address other possible interpretations, for instance, that the negative stock market responses were driven solely by the media attention to the business model of o¤shore banks. However, such interpretations are less plausible given that we …nd no stock market responses to other events directly related to o¤shore tax evasion and covered intensively in international media, but carrying no new information about the risk of exposure for o¤shore account owners and banks. The date of the event is either the date mentioned in the article or, in the absence of such information, the calendar day before the article was published. The headline is in the author's own translation from German. The front page article about event #8 states that it happened during the weekend 14/15 July 2012, but not the precise date; however, as the event studies are only concerned with trading days, this has no bearing on the estimations. (2) indicates the results with the portfolio return weighted by market capitalization; Column (3) indicates the results for an unweighted portfolio of Swiss banks with no known link to offshore tax evasion. All regressions include a set of event time dummies as described in the main text. (1)- (2) and (5)- (6) show results for the unweighted portfolio return while Columns (3)- (4) and (7)- (8) show results for the portfolio return weighted by market capitalization. In Columns (1) and (3), the portfolio only includes Swiss banks that have been subject to criminal investigations in the U.S. for their role in offshore tax evasion. In Columns (2) and (4), the portfolio only includes Swiss banks that have admitted to criminal tax-related offences under the Swiss Bank Program. In Columns (5) and (7), the portfolio only includes Swiss banks that have paid penalties above the sample median. In Columns (6) and (8), the portfolio only includes Swiss banks that have paid penalties below the sample median. All regressions include a set of event time dummies as described in the main text. Note: The table shows the results from the main event study specification applied to various leaks. Column (1) concerns leak #2 where the French Budget Minister announced the acquisition of a list with Frensh owners of undeclared Swiss accounts; Column (2) concerns leak #4 when Hervé Falciani revealed himself as the source of the data leak from HSBC; Column (3) concerns leak #11 where ICIJ published the HSBC customer lists as the Swiss Leaks; Column (4) concerns leaks #3, #5-#10 and #12-#13; Column (5) concern s the date at which it became publicly known that Uli Hoeness was under investigation for offshore tax evasion. All regressions include a set of event time dummies as described in the main text. 
